Obaseki and MOWAA: A Public Legacy Wrapped in Private Control?
MOWAA Part Two: https://www.facebook.com/reel/891902693238787 MOWAA Part Three: https://www.facebook.com/reel/1599433218163718
When the Museum of West African Art (MOWAA) was unveiled, it was framed as a cultural rebirth — a legacy project rooted in Edo history and built on a partnership involving the Edo State Government, national institutions, and the Benin Palace. It was presented as public-spirited, heritage-driven, and institutionally anchored.
However, a review of incorporation documents, amended governance papers, and Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) filings tells a more complex and troubling story — one marked by structural contradictions, quiet governance changes, and unresolved questions about control.
A Public Narrative, a Private Legal Vehicle.
MOWAA is not a government agency. It is registered as a private Company Limited by Guarantee (LTD/GTE), originally incorporated on 13 January 2020 under the name EMOWAA Trust Ltd/GTE before later becoming Museum of West African Art Ltd/GTE.
In law, a LTD/GTE is controlled not by sentiment or public messaging, but by its registered members and guarantors. These are the persons with the authority to appoint directors, approve resolutions, and ultimately steer the organisation.
This distinction is critical — because while MOWAA’s public documents describe an institutional partnership, CAC filings show a different configuration.
The Membership Discrepancy
Amended Articles of Association state that the “members” of MOWAA comprise the Edo State Government, the National Commission for Museums and Monuments (NCMM), the Royal Palace of Benin, and independent directors.
Yet CAC records list private individuals as the registered guarantors and members of the company.
In governance terms, this is not a cosmetic issue. In a LTD/GTE structure, registered members are the legal source of power. If institutions are not properly reflected at CAC level, their authority exists largely in narrative rather than enforceable corporate control.
Who Appoints the Board?
The Articles further provide that directors are appointed by the members. This places enormous importance on who qualifies as a member in law, not just in principle.
If institutional partners are not clearly established as registered members, then questions naturally arise:
Who has been appointing directors?
Who has the power to remove them?
And who ultimately controls board composition?
These questions became sharper following a series of documented board changes.
The Quiet Changing of Names
CAC filings show that on 4 February 2022, key directors were formally removed from the board. Another significant round of resignations and fresh appointments occurred on 23 October 2024, again altering the governance landscape.
While these changes were legally filed, what remains unclear is which institutional stakeholders initiated or approved them. No publicly accessible documentation shows clear nomination trails from Edo State Government, NCMM, or the Benin Palace corresponding to these restructurings.
In public-interest projects, trustee and board changes typically follow transparent institutional processes. When such changes occur quietly, without clear attribution, they raise legitimate governance concerns.
A Quorum Clause That Raises Eyebrows
Further scrutiny of the Articles reveals that a general meeting quorum is defined as a majority of five members. Yet if effective registered membership is limited or unclear, this clause appears misaligned with reality.
Such inconsistencies suggest either a governance template that was never fully reconciled with actual filings, or a structure that evolved without adequate harmonisation between narrative and law.
Public Funds, Private Levers
There is documented evidence that Edo State Government funds were applied to the MOWAA project ecosystem, including counterpart funding and construction-related expenditures during the period of the administration of Godwin Obaseki.
Funding, however, does not automatically translate to control.
The critical unanswered question is whether the public funding was matched with clear, enforceable governance rights — membership status, voting power, or appointment authority — that protect public interest within the company’s legal framework.
The Iheanacho–Afriinvest Question
One recurring figure in MOWAA’s governance documents is Phillip Iheanacho, listed as a guarantor, director, and signatory to key resolutions.
Iheanacho is widely known within Nigeria’s financial sector and has longstanding professional associations linked to Afriinvest, a firm historically associated with Obaseki’s career in investment banking and asset management.
No document reviewed makes a criminal allegation or asserts illegality. However, in governance and public accountability, proximity matters. When a publicly funded cultural project is legally controlled through structures dominated by individuals with close professional links to the sitting governor of the time, the optics alone demand scrutiny.
Questions That Remain
Taken together, the documents raise fundamental issues:
A public partnership narrative sits uneasily beside private control markers.
Institutional membership is asserted in Articles but not clearly reflected in CAC guarantor records.
Board and trustee changes occurred without transparent institutional attribution.
Public funds were committed without corresponding clarity on enforceable public governance rights.
These are not artistic questions. They are governance questions.
Part One of a Larger Story
This examination focuses on structure, control, and governance. It does not yet interrogate the financial dimension.
That comes next.
This is Part One of the MOWAA investigation. See all three:
MOWAA Part Two: https://www.facebook.com/reel/891902693238787
MOWAA Part Three: https://www.facebook.com/reel/1599433218163718
Part Two below will examine the cost implications — procurement, construction figures, counterpart funding, and what Edo State and Nigerians ultimately paid for this legacy project.
Truth UnveiledOsigwe Omo-Ikirodah is the Principal and CEO of Bush Radio Academy.
MOWAA Part Two: https://www.facebook.com/reel/891902693238787
MOWAA Part Two: Obaseki, Iheanacho, and the Moment Counterpart Funding Became the Project
By Osigwe Omo-Ikirodah
The numbers around MOWAA tell a story that refuses to stay quiet.
The pavilion at the heart of the project was initially valued at ₦4.1 billion. Edo State’s role was described as straightforward: provide land and offer counterpart funding, while international donors supplied the bulk of the capital.
But that balance never held.
Edo State began paying in tranches.
₦300 million.
₦700 million.
Subsequent documents show that ₦1.5 billion had already been paid, followed by another request for ₦1 billion. More demands came after that, each justified by inflation, foreign exchange pressures, and rising construction costs. The numbers kept changing. The appeals did not stop. By the time payments finally slowed, Edo State’s exposure had ballooned to roughly ₦3.8 billion — nearly the full original cost of the pavilion.
At the same time, a different figure was being spoken of in public forums — over $25 million raised internationally for MOWAA, according to statements made by Philip Iheanacho and Ike Chioke, who were presented as the key drivers of the project’s fundraising efforts.
That is where the contradiction hardens.
If tens of millions of dollars were flowing in, why did Edo keep paying?
Why was counterpart funding treated as an open-ended tap?
And why did public funds nearly equal the project’s starting value?
Every naira paid by Edo moved through the same structure — Legacy Restoration Trust, later renamed EMOWAA, and now MOWAA. Different names, same pipeline. And within that pipeline, financial control appears tightly concentrated, raising uncomfortable questions about safeguards, oversight, and accountability for billions in public funds.
Edo also contributed prime land, yet there is no clear public valuation showing how that asset was counted, protected, or reflected in the project’s financial architecture.
This is no longer about art.
It is no longer about architecture.
It is about power and propriety — a moment when counterpart funding quietly became the main funding, while donor money stayed largely at the level of headlines, and billions in public funds flowed through a structure controlled by a single dominant signatory. In any public-facing heritage institution, morality demands safeguards, shared authority, and transparent controls. When one man signs, decides, and directs, the question is no longer just where the money went, but whether such concentration of financial power is defensible in a project built with public trust.
And this is where the circle closes: when a heritage project funded with Edo’s billions is administered through a structure dominated by directors drawn from the same Afrinvest ecosystem that shaped Godwin Obaseki’s professional career, the claim of independence can no longer be assumed — it must be proven. Until that proof is laid bare, the questions remain, and Truth Unveiled does not end here.
Truth Unveiled — Part Two
Part Three will name donors, track FX inflows, and follow the money to its final destinations.
Osigwe Omo-Ikirodah is the Principal and CEO of Bush Radio Academy.
MOWAA Part One: https://www.facebook.com/reel/1501115394309824
MOWAA Part Two: https://www.facebook.com/reel/891902693238787
MOWAA Part Three: https://www.facebook.com/reel/1599433218163718
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